What is the smallest version of your organisation that has to keep running?

Over the weekend of 11 to 12 October 2026, Ahold Delhaize detected suspicious activity in its IT infrastructure and took systems offline as a precaution, including its brands' websites and apps. Its update of 19 October 2026 confirmed that the activity "resulted from the malicious actions of others", said the Dutch National Cyber Security Centre had been notified within 24 hours and a police report filed, and said the group had no evidence at that point that sensitive customer, associate or partner data had been taken. "Throughout this incident, our brands' stores remained open to serve customers."

The rest came back in stages. Albert Heijn told ANP that stores were restocked with shelf-stable products from 14 October and fresh products from 15 October; home deliveries restarted on 23 October 2026 at about a third of normal capacity. In its third-quarter results on 4 November 2026, the group said the incident mainly affected its online capabilities in the Benelux and the US and its Benelux supply-chain operations, that most of the disruption was contained within two weeks, and that it expects fourth-quarter net sales to be €200 million to €250 million lower as a result. How the attackers got in has not been published.

The open store ran on systems customers never see

The stores are the part of the business everyone saw. Behind them sits a chain that does not appear on a shop floor: ordering and replenishment, warehouse management, transport planning, the distribution centres. The group's own results name its Benelux supply-chain operations among the parts most affected. In Belgium, an Albert Heijn spokesperson told the Brussels Times that the stores switched to an alternative supply system and stayed stocked, "albeit on a lower level".

The lesson reaches well beyond groceries. The service you would name as critical is usually the front end of a longer chain: a manufacturer's shipping runs on the ERP, the warehouse system, label printers and a carrier's portal. A continuity plan that lists only the customer-facing service protects the shop window and leaves the supply route behind it undefined.

Decide what keeps running before deciding what to restore

The term "minimum viable company" travels mostly through the data-protection industry, where it means the systems to restore first from clean copies. That list is the last step of the analysis, not the first. The question comes before any system: which parts of the business must keep working when most of it cannot?

VNO-NCW and MKB-Nederland put it plainly in their January 2026 resilience guide for Dutch companies: "Welke activiteiten zijn echt cruciaal voor jouw bedrijf?" and "Wat is het minimale bedrijfsproces dat noodzakelijk is voor het voortbestaan?" Answering those questions takes decisions only management can make:

  • Which services and customers come first. Not every product line, site or customer segment carries the same weight in a crisis, and someone has to rank them.
  • What level of service is acceptable, and for how long. A store with a reduced range, deliveries at a third of the slots, invoicing that waits a week.
  • What the organisation stops on purpose. Promotions, loyalty schemes, new customer onboarding. Stopping them frees people and capacity for the minimum.
  • What each remaining service runs on. Applications and data, operational technology, sites, power and connectivity, the people who can run it by hand, and the suppliers who feed it.
  • Where the minimum itself fails. The point at which stock runs out, perishables are lost, payroll cannot run or a regulatory deadline is missed.

The result should fit on a page a board member can read in a crisis: the services, the minimum level for each, how long it holds, what it depends on, and who owns it. A spreadsheet of four hundred applications, each tagged critical, does not tell anyone what to keep running on day three.

Degraded operation is a mode you design in advance

Running at a minimum means working differently, and it only holds if it was written down before anyone needed it. For each service in the minimum, three things have to be specific.

What people use instead: a standing order per store based on recent weeks' sales, printed picking lists, a phone list for the carriers, paper registers for goods received. A fallback that depends on the platform that was taken offline is not a fallback.

Who allocates scarce capacity. When delivery runs at a third of normal, someone decides who gets the slots: subscription customers, care institutions, orders already paid for. That is a commercial decision with reputational weight, not one for whoever is on shift.

Who tells customers and suppliers what to expect. The Verbond van Verzekeraars, promoting the NCTV's Denk vooruit campaign to businesses, asks for "afspraken over wie wat doet met welke middelen" and a way to stay reachable "voor leveranciers, afnemers en klanten". Its scenarios of 72 hours without internet and telephony, and 72 hours without electricity, are a good test for any minimum.

The minimum should also say what may be shut down deliberately, and by whom. The VNO-NCW guide notes that "soms is het veilig en beheerst stilleggen van het bedrijf, beter of zelfs noodzakelijk". A precautionary shutdown is easier to order quickly when everyone already knows what keeps running while the systems are down.

The way back follows the same map

Coming back is where most of the decisions sit, and the minimum viable company gives them their order: shared foundations such as identity, network and planning systems first, customer-facing channels after.

Each stage needs criteria before it goes live: systems checked for signs of compromise, credentials and active sessions reset, monitoring in place to spot the attacker's return, and a named person who signs the stage off. Without criteria, pressure to restore the most visible service first wins, whatever it depends on.

One step is easy to miss: for a while the organisation runs in two modes at once. Orders taken by phone and stock moved on paper have to be entered back into the restored systems and reconciled, or the first automated replenishment run is built on wrong data. Someone needs to own that reconciliation and decide when the workarounds stop.

Where the regulation puts the responsibility

For organisations within the scope of NIS2, in force in the Netherlands through the Cyberbeveiligingswet since 15 August 2026, this is a legal duty, not good practice. Article 21(2) requires measures "based on an all-hazards approach", including "business continuity, such as backup management and disaster recovery, and crisis management" (point c). Under Article 20, the management body approves those measures, oversees their implementation and can be held liable for infringements. A board cannot approve a continuity approach without knowing what it is meant to keep running.

The Wet weerbaarheid kritieke entiteiten took effect on the same date. Ministries designate critical entities per sector; after designation, an entity has nine months for a risk assessment covering threats from natural disasters to sabotage, and ten months to meet its duty of care. Most mid-sized organisations will not be designated. Many supply one that is, and can expect to be asked in contracts what they will still deliver during a disruption, and for how long.

Whether a given organisation falls within either law is a separate question. For those outside, the VNO-NCW guide says "niets is verplicht". Their customers may still ask.

What prepared looks like

Authority. The board approves the minimum: the services, their minimum levels and the order of recovery. It names a crisis lead and a backup with the mandate to switch to degraded operation, stop non-essential services and allocate scarce capacity without waiting for consensus.

Trigger. Each service in the minimum has a stated maximum tolerable outage. The fallback starts when a core platform (ERP, warehouse management, identity) is shut down for longer than that, or a site loses power or connectivity for longer than its backup supply lasts.

Continuity. Each fallback is written down at the level of a standing order list and a phone list, held outside the systems it replaces, and exercised once a year by the people who would use it. A named person informs customers and suppliers. Each restore stage has sign-off criteria, and someone owns reconciling the work done by hand.

If your core systems were taken offline as a precaution tomorrow morning, which services would you still deliver on the third day, at what level, and who has already approved that list?

Initiate engagement.

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